Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination

The combination of a multiparty system and presidentialism is especially inimical to stable democracy.
Multiparty presidentialism is especially likely to produce immobilizing executive/legislative deadlock, and such deadlock can destabilize democracy.

Multipartism is more likely than bipartism to produce ideological polorization, thereby complicating problems often associated with presidentialism. The combination of presidentialism and multipartism  is complicated by the difficulties of interpaty coalition building in presidential democracies, with deleterious consequences for democratic stability.

The choice regarding institutions are important, none is more important than the system of government.

Subcategory of presidential systems: those in multiparty democracies

Weakness: the rigidity associated with the fixed tem, executive/legislative deadlock, and a greater likelihood that the head of government will have limited administrative and party experience. It do not have mechanism intended to ensure legislative majorities (the president's party often has majority, or close to it, in two-party system, but rarely does so with multipartism).

There are just 4 democracies between 31 stable democracies with this institutional configuration.

Multiparty presidentialism is more likely to produce immobilizing executive/legislative deadlock than either parliamentary systems or two party presidentialism.

Two-party systems presidentialism is more likely. High -entry barriers keep radical actors out of the party system, and the need to win votes from the center encourages moderation, and the abscence of extremist parties and the centripetal nature of party competition favoring democratic stability by assuring actors that electoral and policy losses will not have catastrophic consequences.

Presidentialism and multipartism is complicated. Difficulties of interparty-coalition building in presidential democracies.

Multiparty coalitions in parliamentary system, the parties choose the cabinet and prime ministers, and they remain responsible for providing support for the government. In presidential systems, presidents put together their own cabinets, and the parties are less firmly committed to supporting the government. In presidential systems legislators of parties with cabinet portfolios do not support the government. Incentives for parties to break coalitions are generally stronger in presidential systems.

Democracy criteria 

1. Democracies must have open competitive elections that determine who governs.
2. Election results cannot be determined by fraud, coercion or major proscriptions.
3. Legislative and executive office must be decided on the basis of elections.
4. Elections must be afford the opportunity of alternation in power.
5. Universal adult suffrage.
6. Guarantees of traditional civil liberties.
   

Presidential democracy (The chief executive is elected by the legislature and term office is fixed)

1. The head of government is essentially popularly elected.
2. Legislative elections and post-election negotiations do not determine executive power.
3. The Head of government is selected by the legislature.
4. President must be the head of government (except semi-presidential systems). 
5. The president is elected for a fixed time of period (president can not be forced to resign because of a no-confidence vote).

Parliamentary democracy

1. Executive branch exists separately from the legislature.
2. No post-election negotiations.
3. Fixed term for head of government
4. The head of government is selected by the legislature and subsequently depends upon the ongoing confidence of the legislature for remaining in office. 

Presidentialism and stable democracy

Democratic longevity. Most of the unstable democracies since 1945 are presidential systems or parliamentary multiparty systems.

Parliamentary systems have mechanism that may lead to relatively frequent changes in cabinets and governments, but this flexibility in changing governments may help preserve regime stability.  On the hooter hand, the fixed electoral timetable of presidential regimes apparently ensures stability in the head of government but introduces a rigidity inimical to regime stability. We need to distinguish between cabinet stability and regime stability. The fixed term also force the president to leave the charge even if the general population, political elites and parties, and other major actors continue to support them.

A greater likelihood of executive legislative deadlock. Presidential systems are more prone to immobility than parliamentary systems. They are more apt have executives whose program is consistently blocked by the legislature, and they are less capable of dealing this problem.

The downside of direct popular elections is that political outsiders with little experience in handling congress can get elected. 

Presidentialism, multipartism, and stable democracy
Of the 31 presidential democracies, 15 had multiparty systems, 10 two-party systems, 5 dominant-party systems, and 1 two-and-one-half party system. Only 1 of the 15 multiparty presidential demcoraciesendured for at least 25 years.

Remember two-party system use to constrict the breadth of opinion represented, and hinder the building of coalition governments, making it difficult to establish consolidation forms of democracy. Two-party systems become less functional and less viable as the spread of opinion becomes greater.

Why presidentialism and multipartism make a difficult combination?


In presidential systems, multipartism increases the likelihood of executive/legislative deadlock and immbobilism. It also increase the likelihood of ideological polarization. Multipartism, presidents need to build interpaty coalitions to get measures through the legislature, but interpaty coalition building in presidential systems is more difficult and less stable than in pariamentary systems.

Because of the separation of powers presidential systems lack means of ensuring that the president will enjoy the support of a majority in congress. Presidents can govern without a majority. Legislatures can block presidential action. In most presidential democracies, the president is largely responsible for policy and legislation. The role is marked by ambivalence and ambiguity.

Most presidential systems presidential role is marked by ambivalence and ambiguity. They can not implement their agenda, if their legislative don't support it.

Exceptions

1. President's party enjoys a majority in the legislature and regularly backs the president.
2. Coalition of parties provides a majority and regularly supports the president.
3. President does not enjoy a stable majority in congress, but is able to govern by creating shifting coalitions.

Parliamentary systems are generally better providing stable support for governments and handle lack of legislative support.
In Presidential systems there is a dissociation between party affiliations of cabinet members and party coalitions. 

The true minority parliamentary governments lasted an average of only 14 months. Presidential governments in which executive/legislative deadlock arises. The parliamentary mechanism of a no-confidence vote is not available.  President lack tools for pushing policy through during period of executive/legislative deadlock. 

If their congressional support dissipates, president become a sitting duck. Presidents use to try constitutional amends. 

Immobilism in presidential democracies has often been a major ingredient in coups. Presidents got enormous responsibilities, they need administer huge, complex, state bureaucracies. 

Presidentialism, multipartism and ideological polarization

Two or two and one half party systems are more likely to be compatible with presidential democracy because ideological polarization is unlikely. These systems have drawbacks, but they are based on the democratic theory of willingness of political actors to accept electoral and policy defeats.  (Intense ideological divisions increase the stakes of the political game, serve as an incentive to polarization and consequently, are less favorable to stable democracy.

1. Party support for the government tends to be more secure in parliamentary systems because of the way executive power is formed and dissolved. In presidential systems the president has the responsibility of putting together a cabinet. Change in cabinets are usually the president's decision and are not brought about by party decisions. 
2. In parliamentary systems, party coalitions generally take place after the election and are binding in presidential systems. In presidential systems, they often take place before the election and are not binding passt election day. Executive power is nor formed through post-election agreements among parties and is not derived among several parties that are coresponsible for governing.  In Parliamentary systems, the same coalition formed government is responsible to govern. An agreement among parties may pertain only to congressional matters, with no binging implication for relations between the parties and the president. 
3. In presidential systems, the commitment of individual legislators to support an agreement negotiated by the party leadership is often less secure.  There is a lack of party discipline. 
4. Incentives for parties to break coalitions are stronger in providentially system. As new presidential elctions appear on the horizon, party leaders generally feel a need to distance themselves from the president in office.

Conclusion

Combination of presidential government and multiparty system is problematic. It is not accident that most stable presidential democracies have had limited party system fragmentation. It raises the possibility that the liabilities of presidentialism pertain mostly to situations of multipartism. Multipartism acerbate some conflicts.
On the other hand, this doesn't happen with parliamentary regimes that have more coalition building mechanism that facilitate multiparty democracy. 

Institutional combination facilitate and others obstruct the management of social, economic, and political problems.

In most presidential democracies  legislative elections are based on proportional representation with district magnitudes sufficiently large to facilitate representation of several parties, making more like that the opposition control a solid majority in congress.

What can be done in terms of constitutional/institutional reform in multiparty presidential democracies?

1. Switching from a presidential system to a semi presidential or a parliamentary system.
2. Taking measures to reduce party system fragmentation. Limiting party system fragmentation, introducing a higher threshold  reducing district magnitude in proportional system, having concurrent congressional and presidential elections.

Efforts to restructure a multiparty system into two-partism would adversely affect legitimacy, especially in party systems with significant ethnic, regional or religious parties that would dissapear under different electoral rules or a wide ideological distance.  The advantages of bipartism thus diminish where there are sharp social or political cleaves.

A change to parliamentary government would need to simultaneously establish mechanism to enhance party discipline. 

Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination

Scott Mainwaring
Comparative Political Studies 1993 26: 198